

Nationalism and War : Analysis of German ideologies of the 19th century and their consequences in Africa

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Abstract: This article analyzes Kant's and Fichte's reflections on nationalism and war, and their consequence on colonialism in Africa. The current questioning of hospitality and cosmopolitanism, associated with the new problem of terrorism, requires revisiting the philosophical contributions of Kant and Fichte. We show that the nationalist ideologies of the 19th century in Germany are at the root of both wars and peace agreements in Europe, and violent colonialism in Africa.

Keywords: Nationalism, colonialism, history, Africa, German ideologies, terrorism.

1 INTRODUCTION

The modernity of political power, coming from the Enlightenment, has taken a special turn with German thinkers, so it is no exaggeration to say that it is the crumbs that have fallen from the table of its thinkers that constitute most of the feast of cosmopolitan thought since the nineteenth century to the present. However, unified Germany is the place and origin of elaborate forms of mass killing, and dictatorial terror. The case of Germany undoubtedly makes it possible to interpret the common imaginary of European colonialism, still relevant today, in : what makes it possible to understand, from the ontological point of view, the colonial cosmopolitanism of Europe in Africa ?

Since antiquity, war has often presented itself, according to the relations of forces at hand, as the movement of conquest of the West towards the East or from East to West, so that the first idea of Terror is naturally associated with this kind of war. But the colonial enterprise from Europe to Africa has ushered in a civilization of and through terror. If civilization, in its original sense, meaning the dwelling of the city, the colonialist West founded African cities and nations on the basis of violence. It is not just a birth pain inherent in benign surgery. There is talk of the congenital transmission of state terrorism, still present in nations without national ideals in Africa.

Admittedly, the historical context of the exodus of empires in Europe is no longer relevant. But in our world, where terrorism is gradually emerging as a mode of political governance, the reflections on perpetual peace, on the balanced sense of nationalism and on the meaning of history, are of undeniable urgency.

The current questioning of hospitality and cosmopolitanism, coupled with the new problem of terrorism, requires taking into account the contributions of Kant and Fichte. It is a question of taking stock of their contribution to the philosophical debates on this subject, and of confronting their thought with that of colonialism and terrorism. Indeed, Kant and Fichte wrote when Europe considered itself as if not the only world, at least the first world ; before the colonization of Africa and the advent of the United Nations. Thus, globalization, in fact, of today's world, calls for a rational lighting, in order to found a new day of living-together-in-diversity.

2 EXCLUSIVE NATIONALISME

Before analyzing German nationalism in the 19th century, it is useful to clarify the meaning of nationalism as we understand it in this study.

The exclusive nationalism of the foreigner occurs when the subject is liquefied and allowed to soak by a soil, without a possibility of evaporation towards the reception of the other. He is a nationalist in the political sense of the habitability of the city, the one who thinks he is one with a land, so that he puts his skin as an insurmountable barrier to everything that is not biologically related to his body.

In such a mixture of inhabitant and territory by him occupied, to seek a liberation from the body is to betray the race, the tribe, or the country. Security is here in the ideas that heredity and blood ties chant, and these are expressed in terms of ideology of the chosen race, religious righteousness, the nation pure of all human and cultural impurities coming from elsewhere. A community of culture, of ideas, of destiny or, in a word, mystical communion, such is the sense of the exclusive nationalism of the foreigner, the eldest son of archaic tribalism. Thus rooted in the soil, in its safe and secure place, the nationalist is chained to those of his culture, in a kind of mass defense.

In many ways, nationalism is not limited to dogmatic political governance, to a parliamentarianism of dictatorial regimes or to a hierocratic policy of religious extremists, but it touches the very humanity of man, when he lives under the fear of an imminent dispossession of his land and his culture by the other who comes. The specific mode of existence of promoters Ethnic and identity conflicts are, of course, the celebration of the monolithic attachment to the place, an attachment which, from an ontological point of view, can be interpreted as *being-riveted*. Attachment to the place is an essential possibility which is part of the ontology of the Being, anxious to be the sole owner of the habitable and consumable space. The category of the *being-rivé* makes it possible to apprehend the ontology of the chain with the cultural links and the ground like vital horizons.

The prior world that enlightens the nationalists is the unity of culture and the land of origin. In such a context, the freedom of man consists in obeying the culture erected as a crystallized and immutable stele of accepted ideas. In this sequence of defenders of culture, the nationalist has for only destiny, the establishment of the unity of the space or the place which supports it, unity of the place which is understood as the solid vase that collects and orients the set of meanings of existence. Unique culture (or lack of culture?) is thus the impersonal matrix of the natives and the reference of things. The exaltation of an immutable and faceless culture leads to questioning the technical abilities of man to the benefit of the archaic power of the possession of the land, whose reign corresponds to the division of humanity in native and foreign, a division which gives rise to the exclusion of those who have no umbilical connection with the soil of their stay.

In this perspective, the problem of nationalism is the denial of natural law, the legitimacy inherent in every human being to inhabit the world. The exclusion of the other and the terrorist action which pushes him to leave his native land, goes beyond the positive right, and aims at the natural right, a right which, at the beginning, is not allowed to be contaminated by the political calculations of the jurists. Natural law, source of human rights, is declarative, like a cry of the oppressed, below the juridism of the nation-states ; natural right that sticks all human skin, to the point of making one with the human identity stature as such. It is a right that protects the man against the possibility of aggression from the other man ; a kind of *legitimate legal defense*, before the societal laws. In this sense, are not human rights basically an abridgement of the fundamental and vital needs of every man whose satisfaction guarantees the survival of the human race on earth?

Beyond the legal term of "law", it is a question of *the needs of the man*, whose taking into account allows the good political governance, economic and territorial, able to ensure the blossoming of each one. Vital needs are a natural right and they are waiting to be expressed in an expression that commands respect.

The human being, from birth to death, has rights identical to those of his fellow human beings, rights that require the establishment of a civil society on the basis of fraternal equality. It is, in a way, the symmetry of rights that underpins the social bond and equality between humans. Men are equal, because they are born with the same rights, expressed in the form of vital needs. This is a *statement* which, by its imperative tone, admits of no discussion. At most, it expects such a natural adhesion of new generations. The naturalness of a right, in the first sense of *natalis* [1], innate, requires imperative recognition, without another form of trial. In this way, it is of the order of ethics, which precedes the legal and founds it.

Therefore, to think of nationalism is to attempt an ethical and political reflection that questions the way in which contemporary societies think of ethics, the relation to the other or the nature of the social bond, based on the model of the Same and autonomy ; model inaugurated by Western Enlightenment philosophy. It is therefore necessary to question, as a purgatory, the Western philosophical tradition on two levels.

1. First, at the level of the *egological* understanding of the individual. Like the thought of the same or the same, the philosophy of human rights, coming from the philosophers of the contract (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), consists in placing individual absolutism as a norm of thought and of right. Certainly, these philosophers have shown that the public space is a legal space, and not the place of narcissistic and demagogic exercise of the sovereign power. But their notion of *civil person* (*persona civilis*) is based on a civil egoism in which rights are, first and foremost, the rights of the individual. Henceforth, one must search within oneself for the truth of the world, as the Socratic *maieutics* of the Greek origins of Western philosophy already testified. Here, it is the subject who discovers in himself the truth of his existence and his absolute right to exist, without receiving anything from others. Such a philosophy leads to subjective understanding by assimilation of the other.

Thomas Hobbes writes, in chapter XVI of *Leviathan* : " *A person, whose words or actions are considered, either as belonging to him or as representing the words or actions of another.* " [2] Hobbes thus interprets this idea of Cicero : *unus sustineo very personas ; Mei, Adversarii, and Judicis* (I assume three personalities : mine, that of my opponent, and that of the judge). Whether acting in one's own name or on behalf of someone else, the civil person remains an individual who assumes the dual function of representative and representative. It is in his capacity as an individual that the person is author or social actor, whether it plays a legal or political role.

That the physical individual is distinct from the juridical notion of person, confirms the idea that representatives, even multiple, such as a parliament, act only in the name of each individual they represent. It is for this reason that for Hobbes, the sovereign is a *unique person* (*una persona*), who represents the acts of each individual and who assumes the person of the republic, so that the notion of civil person is *assimilable* to that of individual. Such an absolutist conception of the individual does not provide a rational basis for cosmopolitan hospitality, since the analysis of the civil person is limited to the level of the indigenous individual, always and already holding a natural and permanent title of stay in the city.

2. Then, there is the idea of autonomy as a natural particularism, which exalts immediate communion with the soil and the place of origin, with the division of the world into nation-states and the notion of nationality. The division of the world into geographic territories as a country is a consecration of the division of persons into national and non-national. It is, in logical terms, an exclusion by principle of non-contradiction : it is not possible to assume at the same time a national identity and its opposite ; we cannot be both national and non-national.

From now, on the question of nationality comes in three aspects: the declaration of birth with the act that ratifies it, the national identity card and the death certificate. From birth to death, three documents authenticate belonging to a nation. And naturalization, which consists in adopting a new nationality, is also the exhibition of a document.

It can thus be seen in contemporary society that the fate of humans is definitely sealed in national identity documents, elements of the positive law of nation-states. There is therefore the problem of the primacy of the natural right to freedom of movement. There is an insurmountable *aporia* that arises between

the natural and individual right to circulate all over the world, and the border restrictions imposed by nation-state legislation.

This problem is at the center of Emmanuel Kant's cosmopolitical theory. Certainly, since the twentieth century, with the appearance of the independent states of Africa and Asia, international relations have taken complex turns. But the actuality of Kantian thought in terms of hospitality and cosmopolitanism is without question.

3 THE KANTIAN THEORIE OF WAR AND TERRORISM

Why, despite Kant's perpetual peace plan, did Germany enter the nationalism and the colonial type of terrorism in the 19th century? This question finds its answer in the analysis of terrorism and colonialism in Kant's time. The terrorist has a vision of the world, the field of war of each against each, according to the Hobbesian perspective of the state of nature. We must show how the Kantian proposal of perpetual peace is a possible solution to the fight against terrorism, given that its understanding of the state of nature as a state of war allows us to identify the different meanings of terrorism.

Kant subscribes fully and explicitly to Hobbes's description: the state of nature is a state of war, effective or virtual, of all against all. It is a state which keeps the same characters between societies as between individuals, so that war can oppose states and individuals. Insofar as a single individual, in the middle of the city, opposes morality and justice, he is in the state of nature ; consequently, humanity in him and through him finds himself in a state of war. It is therefore possible to make a similarity between this individual, in society, who would be in a state of nature because he wants war, and the terrorist who, individually, goes to war with a whole State. In this sense, the terrorist would be the man who, within civil society, intends to remain in a state of nature, against law and morality.

On the moral plane, Kant recognizes in the human nature a perversity, which is not the fact of the civil society. Indeed, this perversity is masked inside the city, and gives free rein only in the state of nature, that is, in the external relations of the states. [3] States are in a state of nature, as long as they do not gather around a peace agreement. Likewise, the individual, by rejecting the common law, enters the war with the rest of society - the social bond being based on reasoning in the service of an egoistic passion. In addition, Kant, by the distinction between the empirical and the *noumenal*, suggests a positive principle that goes entirely beyond the psychological or sociological description. Even through pure egoistic feeling, man is overcome by the desire to leave the war, so that selfishness is not an absolute obstacle to peace.

On the legal side, Kant writes :

"Even if it is granted that it does not always prevail between people not governed by external laws real hostilities, nevertheless the state of these people, that is to say the report in and by which they are rights, is a state in which everyone wants to judge himself of what he considers to be his right vis-à-vis others, having in this respect even no guarantee on their part, nor their providing, to the reserve of the force proper to each; this is a state of war where one must be constantly armed against the other " [4] .

This is why the conception of the state of nature as a state of war does not come from experience and does not depend on the conception of moral evil; it is therefore sheltered from all psychological, moral and sociological refutations, *"for this state is a continual lesion of the rights of all the others. "* [5] . Kant insists very strongly on the idea that the state of nature is morally unjust, and that it is morality that imperatively orders to go to the civil status. The uncertain and dangerous nature of the state of nature lies in the absence of a legal framework that would make violence impossible.

Consequently, the postulate of public law : *" Because of the inevitable coexistence relationship between you and other men, you must leave the state of nature to enter a legal state. "* Is derived analytically from the concept of law in external relations. It is by observing the conflicting relations between states that the necessity of public law appears. But, more deeply, it is demanded directly by morality, as "absolute and primary duty." If the individuals are between them in a state of war, the states are in the state of nature ; so that states, in turn, like individuals, must abandon the state of nature to enter a legal state guaranteeing peace. It is probably for these reasons that Kant is extremely sensitive to the incompleteness of a legal constitution, limited to internal order. In other words, the establishment of a perfect civil constitution is linked to the

establishment of legal relations between states, from the perspective of the classic notion of the *law of nations*.

Thus, the "law of nations" begins, in paragraph 54 of *the doctrine of the law* of Kant, from the same perspective of public law. It is formulated in three points:

"The elements of the law of nations are: 1) that the States considered in their external mutual relations (as savages without laws) are naturally in a non-juridical state: - 2 ° that this state is a state of war (of the law of the land); stronger), although there is not always always war and always hostility. This respective position (when both people want nothing better), although it does not in fact result in any injustice to anyone, is, however, very unjust in itself, and the neighboring states of each other are obliged to leave; (3) that it is necessary that there be an international pact conceived according to the idea of a primitive social contract, and by which the peoples are obliged respectively not to interfere in the intestine discord; each other, but nevertheless to guarantee each other foreign attacks. "

For Kant, practical reason enjoins States, considered as legal persons, to enter a legal state which, at the same time, retains their personal autonomy and proscribes war. The organ of this pact or alliance must be a permanent Congress of States. In this way, practical reason, as the seat of morality, bases a priori the concept of the League of Nations. Kant thus intends to make the transition from the state of nature to the juridical state, from natural warfare to instituted peace.

However, it should be noted that alienated liberty by men is such that force in society substitutes itself for the law. The institution of peace is the establishment of the rule of law. It is therefore necessary to found at once the impossibility of demonstrating with absolute rigor the pessimistic forecasts of political wisdom, and their absolute opposition to the imperatives of morality. It is advisable not to exchange the binding certainty of this one, attested by the moral conscience, against the apparent probability of that one, attested by a partial and partial observation. It is for this reason that Kant elaborates a philosophy of history, which offers reasons for optimism both to counterbalance pessimistic skepticism as a whole and to overcome in a devious way its main objection to perpetual peace. The philosophy of history should bring reflection on morality, the metaphysical coefficient, based on the global vision of human societies and their common destiny.

We can therefore retain that, in the first place, the idea of the perfect legal constitution that should inspire action does not come from experience, it is *a priori*; in the second place, even if its realization is not certain, this idea, whose use is only regulative, has no limits, for it necessarily leads to progress towards perpetual peace. Liberty being *a priori* notion of practical reason, it is absurd to judge ideas from experience. Following the path of duty entails a postulate, a supposition or a utopia concerning the possibility of progress towards the final goal. The question that remains is this : how to make it possible for states to follow the reason which, in truth, belongs to the individual ?

To solve this question, Kant proposes a specific interpretation of history, of progress and of the possibility of perpetual peace, which does not make contradictory or absurd the political action inspired by the moral law. There would therefore be a radical opposition between reason and experience, between morality and nature; for nature and experience would appear as hostile to the perpetual peace demanded by morality and reason. In practical terms, we would decide to act on his behalf by a kind of bet, the theory of which has only been able to prove the possibility.

It must be able to produce a new way of looking at nature, experience and history. These must be able to lend themselves to a reading or to an interpretation which is more reconcilable with the ideal of perpetual peace than were the considerations on the men's fighting mood and their will to dominate which had fueled skepticism of political wisdom towards it. In this way, we will return to this experience that we had rejected and that we will look for a thread and signs to detect progress towards peace, legality and morality.

As a result, Kant shows that it is impossible to rigorously predict free actions. In his text entitled *Conflict of Faculties* [6], Kant deals with the prophetic history of humanity in these terms: *"It is necessary, nevertheless, to relate to some experience the prophetic history of the human race. "* Such an experience can be projected in the future and in the past as a "historical sign" (*signum reniemorativum, demonstrativutn, prognosticum*) indicating the tendency of the human race to progress.

The question that arises then is this: if history is to be interrogated in the perspective of the end assigned to it by practical reason, and if one must look for signs of progress towards it in the end. well-being, at what level will these signs be found? It is here that both the originality and depth of the Kantian response are manifested, and its character essentially out of politics. Kant searches for experience with signs favorable to

perpetual peace; but it is not the same experience of which he found the opposition to it and challenged the decisive character. Basically, men, as natural beings whose free will is affected by sensible motives, will never freely choose to take the steps necessary for perpetual peace.

From then on there remain only two possibilities for conceiving the realization of perpetual peace: either man will choose it freely, but to obey the law; or he will be forced by a higher power. And, since the prediction must be based on signs already existing in the experiment, the two possibilities are reduced to these: either the historical experience manifests traces of the moral disposition of the human species which must bring it to overcome one's inclinations and to enter a universal legal state; or it manifests traces of the action of a superior power which, unbeknownst to them, would divert the actions of men from their individual ends to serve them in its overall plan which would coincide with perpetual peace.

These two possibilities are precisely the two versions of the Kantian philosophy of history. The first is that of the *Conflict of Faculties*, where the enthusiasm aroused by the French Revolution is seen as a sign of a "moral disposition of humanity" and an ability to progress such that no policy could have been by subtlety, free it from the previous course of events. But Kant himself recognizes that in the course of human history, rare acts of wisdom have been submerged by waves of madness and wickedness. To predict that it will be otherwise, it is necessary to find in the work, in the history, another power which can force the provisions and the immoral actions to favor the emergence and the effectiveness of the dispositions and the moral actions.

The *Conflict of Faculties*, as such, ends with a chapter which shows the subordinate character of moral education properly so called and of human liberty, in relation to the superior or indirect causes which push men in the right direction. There is history only to the extent that freedom is exceeded, when human actions undergo a meaning that is not their choice, even if it results only from the totality of their own game. The story occurs when the passage from the conscious to the unconscious and from the particular to the total takes place, with the appearance of experience that can justify the practical ideal of perpetual peace. Paradoxically, it is to the extent that men do not do what they want, when their projects betray them that morality can progress and register in nature. It is only by being unconscious instruments of the plan of nature that they prepare a State destined to enable them to act as autonomous ends.

Kant posits a difference between the ends of individuals (apparent interest) and those of nature (real interest). It is nature that takes charge of the violence and immorality of politics, it is she who applies the maxim: "The end justifies the means", the use of which is rigorously prohibited to individuals by the practical reason. In this perspective, the French Revolution, the insurrection of peoples against tyrants and wars of liberation call for a double judgment, retrospective justification by history and unconditional condemnation by morality.

As we can see, Kant's ethical and juridical position eliminates both the theoretical question of the best political regime and the practical question of political judgment. It advocates a legalism based on the universal legitimate solution. In addition, its historical and juridical position evacuates all practical considerations of judgment and prudence, in favor of the hidden work of nature, which acts through us, in our place and without our knowledge. Here again, Kant operates a synthesis between perpetual peace projects that were before, adding a metaphysical or historical supplement. He initiated a philosophy of history based on the idea of a progressive education of humanity with a universalist character.

4 THE IDEA OF COSMOPOLITANISM

It is well known that hospitality finds its first philosophical analysis in Emmanuel Kant, in the Third Definitive Article of the *Perpetual Peace Project* (1795), in paragraph 62 of the *Metaphysics of Mores* (1797), in part of the *Conflict of faculties* (1798), as well as in certain fragments of his posthumous work. Kant deals precisely with cosmopolitan law as an autonomous body in relation to the law of nations and public law internal to the State.

That cosmopolitan law has a specific status depends on its cross-national and transnational nature. To solve the problems or conflicts that may arise between individuals belonging to different states, Kant

suggests the development of a cosmopolitan right. This right concerns, inter alia, transnational trade and the right to visit a foreign country, and aims, in the last instance, to outline the solidarity between people, across state borders.

Such a right, in so far as it concerns the human being in general, must be based on reason. From this point of view, it is the reason which, in its function of faculty which establishes the universal rules of morality, should give the rational frameworks of the solidarity or the imperative of the mutual aid between humans. Solidarity between humans, across national boundaries, arises from belonging to the same humanity or, according to Kant's expression, to a *general human state* or *allgemeiner Menschenstaat* [7].

This is because we are one humanity, from the perspective of the human race, we are, globally, a community called to live in peace, a peace necessitated by the fact of sharing the same planetary surface. Peace is, in the end, hospitality itself. It goes beyond the legitimate defense of oneself and one's property. Peace is therefore the great business of the human species.

It is a question of recognizing that the earth is a whole, and each individual, occupying a part of this whole, is interacting with the others. For this reason, each occupier of the earth must tend (*hinwirken*) towards the moral and unconditional duty of solidarity towards all, manifested concretely by the mutual reception, beyond the policy of the States. Such solidarity, because it is founded on reason, is the very purpose of human action or morality.

To present solidarity as the finality of human action is to recognize that it is an imperative duty of cosmopolitan law, in a cosmos constituted by beings endowed with reason. From this point of view, solidarity is an element of justice, not of charity. Justice, for Kant, is an imperative of reason, that is to say a universal rule that every rational being follows naturally ; while charity is a conditional duty derived from the love of neighbor, with a background of religious morality.

Insofar as solidarity is an obligation of right and not a duty of beneficence or a duty of virtue, it is bound to be limited by positive law, to enter into the regulation of interhuman relations in society. State legislation is needed to bring the moral principles of practical reason to the balanced regulation of social relations. This right to solidarity concerns two essential areas mentioned by Kant in his *Perpetual peace project* .

The first area is that of the right to hospitality, which concerns individuals in their direct relations, outside relations between sovereign states. Thus, a foreigner has the right to go to another country, without having a right to immigration, so that he can be rejected by the natives, if he is not in danger of death in his country backgrounds. The right of asylum is thus granted to those whose physical integrity and freedom are in danger in their country.

It should be emphasized that Kant places the duty of hospitality in transnational relations, but between individuals and populations outside the sphere of the state. Each migrant comes to meet the native, without any agreement between their states. The reasons for exile are also personal, linked to an individual situation. And, whatever the reasons, exile is an individual final decision.

As a result, Kantian cosmopolitical law stipulates an unconditional duty to hospitality that applies to citizens individually, not to the state. It is in the face-to-face relationship between at least two people, one of whom is threatened in his country and the other is indigenous, that the duty of solidarity applies. Whether states are informed or not, whether they agree or not, hospitality is possible. It is a private right of asylum that may possibly oppose attempts to expel the legitimate government. The native who hosts, according to Kant, can oppose the decision to repatriate foreigners from his government, keeping them in his home. Such an approach is only true in states whose constitution recognizes the inviolable character of the home.

It can be seen that the duty of solidarity is examined by a lover, from the fact that the migrant suffered at home, in a passivity of the innocent. In this way, it is as a victim that one seeks asylum in another, and not a hangman. As a result, Kant did not consider the possibility of the exile posing, downstream, as a terrorist. It must be affirmed, however, by virtue of a solidarity based on reason, that the exile animated by reason, can only welcome in its true value the hospitality offered to him. In this sense, the terrorist approach would be outside the frame of reason, because it cannot be justified rationally, it is neither universal nor universalisable. A question then arises : Can we do an irrational act while being human ? In other words, is terrorism understandable by reason ? The answer to this question will come down. For now, let's continue the presentation of Kantian thought.

The second area concerns the possible cause of exile. According to Kant, the violation of a human right in one part of the world has repercussions on the rest of the planet. To this end, Kant advocates the

elaboration of a world constitution that guarantees a duty of solidarity with the victims of serious violations of human rights.

These two areas of the duty of transnational solidarity are unconditional duties of law, which are subject to the duties of virtue, which are unrestricted because they are of charity alone. It should be affirmed that these principles of solidarity constitute the Kantian contribution in the development of an ethics of hospitality capable of guiding world politics. Hospitality is the other name of peace, because it consists of mutual acceptance. The cosmopolitan challenge of peace is its perpetuity.

Perpetual peace is, for Kant, a necessary idea, founded on reason. This is the reason that requires its realization. But the Kantian concept of peace is illuminated by a special light when it is posed in the face of its conception of war.

According to Kant, war is the expression of human nature. The careful observation of the children shows that man is wild at birth and in his early years, with a penchant for violence and war for assertiveness. Kant starts from a natural idea of war or the wickedness of man to found the peace project Perpetual. In this perspective, although peace is based on reason, its conditions do not come totally from the a priori, but from a reflection that starts from the concrete. It is a question of examining the passage from the man of nature to culture, through the mediation of education.

Therefore, to educate means to pass, to the rigorous finesse of free reason, because, according to Kant, " *nature irresistibly wants the supreme power to finally return to the law.* " [8] By the time Kant writes his treatise on perpetual peace, Western societies already have a civil right, both domestically and internationally. It is this existence of civil law that allows the advance towards cosmopolitan law, the advent of which would correspond to perpetual peace. The perpetuity of peace should devote the passage from a dialectical history to a non-dialectical history based on peace.

Such a transition can only be achieved if States manage to establish among themselves the same kind of relationship that exists between individuals within a state. It is, basically, to recognize, beforehand that states are in a kind of state of nature, that of the war or actual war of each against each. To help States to get out of this state of affairs, it must be taken into account that each state has a legal basis summarized in the constitution, with its own rules of application. In addition, from a sociological and psychological point of view, there are differences between peoples that do not allow integration into a larger community. Kant therefore proposes an alliance of free peoples who oppose war. This alliance does not lead to an international organization as such, but to a political solution based on the federalism of free peoples, beyond the law.

Such a political federalism guarantees more chances of success for little risk, more results for few means, a very short completion time and fewer agents. These three requirements call for the evolution of the constitution of each state of the federation towards a republican form, which gives more power of decision to the citizens. A constitution is republican, when it is based on the freedom of the members of the state considered as men, on the dependence of all on the same law and on the equality of all as citizens. It is for this reason that sovereignty must belong effectively to the people and not to kings. The progress of the liberty of the peoples determines the advent of peace between the States.

That law is at the center of perpetual peace between states, Kant certainly envisages, with the idea of the City of Peoples, considered the ultimate goal of the philosophy of history. If the City of Peoples is the necessary form of government, the confederation represents the negative supplement and the legal form sufficient to fulfill the minimum conditions of the idea of right, that is to say of a right that assumes the right cosmopolitan, according to which man is a citizen of a great City of Peoples, so that his rights are constitutional rights. And from the perspective of the free confederation of peace, we can reduce this cosmopolitan right to conditions of hospitality, because the establishment of the City of the peoples must not be done by the war.

It is therefore a question of avoiding any excess of violence. This means that we must favor an evolutionist approach in the sense of a civilizing and communicative process, in opposition to all forms of revolution.

5 FICHTE AND THE NATIONALISM

The question of war and peace is dealt with by Fichte in the framework of political thought. But unlike Kant, Fichte's political philosophy is crossed by a closed nationalism, totally opposed to the proposal of international federalism, which guarantees security and peace in the relations of States. We will attempt, here, a transversal reading of his major political texts, to detect traces of a cosmopolitan theory. Such a reading will undoubtedly enable us to verify the following idea : the cosmopolitanism embodied by Western Europe today, is not a model to be exported to other continents, because it is based on an idea of salvation from the German nation.

It should be noted that Fichte is the defender of the cosmopolitanism of the Aufklärung, tinged with a patriotic fervor inspired by the nostalgia of the Germanic Empire . Faced with the abstract anthropology of the world citizen coming from *philosophers of the contract* he opposes the abstract anthropology of the German opening the march of a regenerated humanity, capable of saving a society in decay, characterized by the loss of its traditional landmarks. The restoration of German values of origins, characteristic of conservatives, would establish a community of thought between *enlightened cosmopolitanism* and *romantic nationalism*.

Fichte conceives of human life as a process that tends towards the realization of a form of humanity, of an idea to which it is a question of corresponding best, so that progress is at the center of human destiny. In this sense, the human being is considered as a historical becoming, walking from itself. Such a future, in its realization, conceals two possibilities : either we must go beyond the peculiarities in each man to let the essential that can unite each to his fellow beings as a species, or it is to recognize the faculty of a particularity to serve the overcoming of all the peculiarities that is to say, the mission of bringing people together around his refined figure. Fichte will retain the second possibility, and the German nation will have the mission to bring about such a model humanity.

From this point of view, Fichtean nationalism does not deny cosmopolitanism as such, but claims to play a redeeming role in it. It is through cosmopolitanism that the universal becomes concretely, as negation and transformation of peculiarities. In the *Patriotic Dialogues* (1806-1808), Fichte establishes a cross between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, on the messianic background of a well-understood nationalism:

" *Cosmopolitanism is the dominant will that the goal of the existence of the human race is actually achieved in the human race. Patriotism is the desire that this goal is reached first and foremost in the Nation of which we are the members and that this result is heard from it to the entire human race (...)* And in this way, all cosmopolitan spirit becomes absolutely necessarily by this limitation to the patriotic nation; and every individual who in his nation would be the most powerful and active patriot is precisely, by the same token, the most active citizen of the world, since the ultimate goal of any national culture is still that this culture extends to the entire human race " [9] .

It is Germany who is the first to assume this project, because it was first to him that he was exposed. It is to him, among all the other European countries, the urgency of self-awareness.

This culture to be promoted is a point of departure, to be exceeded in the meeting of other national cultures. But in this effort towards the universal, the German can only leave German. The approach to follow is thus traced : formation of a culture nation to spread over all of humanity ; extension of this culture to other national wishes, in order to make it appear as a figure of the absolute life realizing itself in the human race ; exceeding the national figure as a subjective measure of destiny, and openness to world civilization, with the primacy and centrality accorded to the human race. For the realization of such a plan, it is necessary beforehand an effort of the human kind on oneself, which implies the definition of a destination to realize ; the education of every human being to this cultural creation.

Thus, the cosmopolitanism coupled with nationalism has the effect of starting from a mobilization of the people and a vast movement of education capable of elevating all consciousness to a clear conception of the spiritual order, with a view to achieving the recognition of a common destiny through peculiarities, and the realization of a true agreement of freedoms. With this in mind, there is a double movement to emphasize : Firstly, the national culture must operate on itself the critical evaluation of its own traditions, to remain faithful to the universal presented in its political constitution and in the space of international legal recognition ; on the other hand, national culture must be recognized as one of many

other possible cultures of the universal. But the question remains what about war and peace at the cosmopolitan level ?

Fichte defends the idea of a strong state, always in attitude of self-growth. Thus, the balance of forces or deterrence would be the surest way to guarantee peace, but a peace that rejects federalism and international law, to land on the idea of a nation that bears the destiny of humanity.

We can see that Fichte's nationalism is at the ideological center of Germany's current role in the European Union. Indeed, beyond its function of economic engine and the original place of money, Germany seems to universalize its culture in Europe. To justify this statement, let us return to the analysis of nationalism.

Nationalism is not limited to the awareness of citizens to belong to a territorial community, political and moral, endowed with own characters ; but it extends to the exaltation of peculiarities, to the affirmation that these constitute a superiority. Nationalism intends to assume a mission, that of offering neighbors its exceptional qualities, of reforming the world according to national standards. This is what comes to light in the idea of a " particular way " German (*Sonderweg*), in state building and the unification process of Germany. Without wishing to enter into the historical narrative of German unification, it suffices to point out some characteristic features of this history, to show the foundations of German nationalism.

It should be noted that Prussia has emerged very quickly as the best place to define a process of homogenisation, starting from the industrial development and the extension of the prerogatives of the State which are concomitant (economic activities, development infrastructure, social legislation, education). This vision has also benefited from a broad consensus within national movements, beyond political differences. Among these divergent political currents, there is liberalism. In the liberal current of nationalism, the nation is conceived as the gathering of its members, of which the state is the emanation. Then there is the national current that bases the national claim on the ethnic community (*Volkstum*) and not political. Here, the nation is defined by the elements of a " Germanness " Primitive present in the language and ancestral customs.

This mixture of administrative modernity and political archaism would make it possible to define the German nation-state. Indeed, liberalist and conservative approaches have been complementary, like most patriots who, during the wars of liberation, have based their claims on a synthesis of these two conceptions.

It was also through the development of the economic, political and cultural machinery of the Prussian state that German nationalism progressed. The rapid industrialization and acceleration of the rail network have made Prussia the economic and intellectual center of the German world. They constitute a lever of popular formation and nationality, as well as the legislative measures impelled by the State (unification of weights and measures, of the currency, the mark, and the commercial law).

And war is the outward expression of this " particular way German, because the foreign policy of the Prussian State proceeds from an identical vision of the national question to that given on the internal level. It helps to ensure the triumph of this conservatism popular ", Which attempts to base monarchical legitimacy on the people, to the detriment of the Austrian conception, which is based on the maintenance of traditional political balances and on a flexible alliance of kingdoms as it exists within the framework of *Bund* .

The military victories against Austria in 1866 and against France in 1870 opened the way for the *Reich*. It is possible to say that these wars, as a confrontation with the enemy, undoubtedly favored the realization of unification. However, the process is part of the continuity of national construction and does not call into question previous political systems.

The *Empire* proclaimed 1871 is a federal state comprising twenty-five states. Each maintains a sovereign government in all areas that do not fall within the competence of the *Reich* (citizen's rights, customs tariffs, circulation, justice, military issues, freedom of the press etc ...). The central government depends on the states that pay it matricular contributions. It also depends on them to enforce the laws of the Empire.

The various sovereigns are besides the only holders of sovereignty of the Empire through the *Bundesrat* which has a right of veto over all decisions of the *Reichstag*. The latter, who is appointed by popular vote, votes on the budget and the laws and even has the legislative initiative. However, it does not

exercise control over the executive and cannot vote a no-confidence vote against the central government. The chancellor depends in fact only on the emperor who appoints him and dismisses him.

Unification, therefore, should not be seen merely as the expression of Prussian hegemony over the whole of Germany. It is a compromise of the different influences that have shaped its development (centralizing and federalist tendencies, democratic and monarchist) and the *Reichstag* its expressive form is not conceived as the place where national sovereignty is exercised, but the link in which national unanimity must be formed against particularisms. From this point of view, the unification of Germany is, to a minimum degree, a form of cosmopolitanism. A nation born from the federation of scattered groups, around a vague idea of culture that brings together in unity, is a form of local peace.

However, such a universal, son of war against neighbors, carries germs of a congenital limit. For this reason, the enlargement of German nationalism to the level of the redemption of all mankind is found, *de facto*, impossible. Indeed, how to become a model of those who have been defeated by weapons? The vanquished are terrified of their enemy who triumphs. As a result, German nationalism is condemned from the outset to an enclosure, because it is considered by the neighbors as the threat of a potential crash.

On the other hand, while the framework in which the German national consciousness has evolved has been considerably broadened, the latter is still indebted to the complex rules that have governed the definition of the nation-state. Similarly, the modernity assumed by the Prussian state has served more to reinforce the national model than to give it new ones. universalisable bases. So the war of 1871, which served as the engine of unification, is symbolically recognized as a national holiday (*Sedanstag*). But the event is not celebrated as a return to the past, by reference to an idealized Holy Empire, far from the idea of a founding act to open a new era for the nation.

Thus, the association of the nation with *Reich* it has certainly helped to establish a real patriotism towards the Empire, but the political form in which United Germany has embodied has stifled in the bud the emergence of a true German national identity that saves humanity. Difficulties in defining unitary national symbols are an example: the *Empire* will never own a national anthem and it is only in 1892 that the colors Prussian impose themselves as national colors.

It should be emphasized, to close this historical analysis, that at the end of the In 1880, the German Empire proclaimed at Versailles appears solidly established, by the work of the politicians, far from philosophical reflections on the State. Bismarck, who is worshiped as "father of the nation", Undertook a work, to establish the national ideal on the *Reich*, become ideal of the nation, with the evolution of the term *volk* (people). Although this term could still refer to the people opposed to the nobles until the 1880s, it essentially refers, from the end of the century, to an ethnic group defined by the existence of a common language and culture. finally, belonging to a common race.

The idea of nation is thus decentered from the purely political sphere, to flourish at the cultural level. And the central state has the task of promoting it. It is therefore a nationalism popular movements *völkisch*, who develops in symbiosis with conservatism popular which guided the *Hohenzollern* policy. In such a context, democracy in its modern sense governance of the nation is taken into account, as preservation of the unity of the *volk* and the state incarnated by the emperor.

This centrality of the nation-state will find in colonization, understood here as annexation of neighboring territories, its privileged soil of deployment. German colonial policy in Europe draws its vital energies from the national question and the democratic tensions it provokes. Indeed, the deployment of signs of greatness and power was intended to favor the consensus sought within. Thus, the evolution of the policy pursued by the *Pan-German League*, for example, is significant, so that his ideology from years 1890 goes beyond colonialism and is structured around the necessary unity of *volk* and the state. The project of the Pan-Germans is to gather in the same state "German" all "Germans" Disseminated in Central Europe, because imperialism is now accepted by all as an element of modernization of the Empire, a way to fight against the influence of traditional elites (see the speech of Max Weber in Friborg in 1895).

From this analysis, it should be remembered: the shift from a philosophical thinking to a contextual historical realization is, in itself, a path of denaturalization. It is as if politicians, wanting to echo philosophical thoughts in their quest for political power, are sliding towards self-containment, the opposite of hospitality and cosmopolitan opening. In a word, the idealism of the German philosophers has been recovered in the world of politics to found, each in turn, a policy of domination which, in many ways, is

close to state terrorism. To ground this claim, we need to put in perspective the colonization of Africa which, in truth, has been a kind of cosmopolitan of and in terror.

At this point, it should be recalled that the German Empire, constituted in 1871, had no colonial territory. Following the private initiatives of a few traders, an expansion program was launched in 1878, leading to the formation of the German Colonial Union (*Deutscher Kolonialverein* , 1882-1883). Following agreements reached between Western countries the Ottoman Empire, Germany sees, in 1884, allocate four zones of expansion which she names *Togoland* (Togo), *Ostafrika* (Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi), *Kamerun* (Cameroon) and *Südwestafrika* (South West Africa). It is on this last territory that a true genocide takes place.

Indeed, the current Namibia, known at the time South West Africa, was a German colony from 1884 to 1915. The first governor of the territory, Heinrich Göring, father of Hermann, the future Nazi leader, will conduct the land occupation operations. When, in 1904, the Herero and Nama, who constituted the bulk of the indigenous population, resisted the colonial troops, General Lothar von Trotha gave the order to exterminate them. This order was entitled "*Order of annihilation*" ("*Vernichtungsbefehl*") .

Repulsed in the desert, without water and without food, about 80 000 people died in a few weeks. The few thousands who survived were later sentenced to forced labor in six camps where most perished. Thus, the expression *Concentration camp* , invented in 1896 by the Spaniards in Cuba, anglicized by the Americans then used by the British during the Boer War, entered the vocabulary of terror or state terrorism.

As a result, during the Treaty of Versailles (signed on June 28, 1919) after the first great war in Europe, more precisely in the fourth part of the treaty, Germany is summoned to give up its colonial empire. It is a matter for the victorious powers to enlarge their colonial empires at the expense of Germany, but also to punish morally Germany, considered responsible for the war, and found, in this sense, unable to assume the "civilizing" mission attached to colonization. The treatment of Hereros and Namas meets the definition of genocide according to the United Nations, namely " *a number of acts accomplished with intention to destroy , in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group* " . This is the second genocide of the 20th century, after that of the Boers by the British, which was to serve as a matrix for the *Third Reich*, against the Jewish and Gypsy populations. It was not until July 10, 2015, that for the first time Germany officially declared genocide the massacre of the Hereros and Namas peoples perpetrated under his command in Namibia in 1904 and 1905.

6 COLONIZATION AS TERRORISM IN AFRICA

Africa is a world dominated continent. This domination is both external and internal. At the external level, it is the former colonial powers that continue to command the political and economic march of the continent. Internally, Africa is sick of its state form, which is characterized by the identification of the state-people, the production of fear by the imposition of the unique thought and the cult of the personality. It is necessary to go back to the origins of the State in Africa to identify the conditions of emergence of terrorism concomitant with the State in Africa.

Colonial penetration in Africa was not commensurate with African hospitality, as it was driven by a desire to extend the territorial sovereignty of post-absolutist European states by divine right. Shortly after his exit from tyranny royalist, tsarist and imperialist of the monarchies of divine right, Europe knows the emergence of nation-states animated all hegemonic nationalist desires. Thus, Europe, in a desire to build an industrial modernity and to gain thickness, experienced the mercantile need to set up its shopping tent on the virgin lands of Africa, in order to drink of its riches soil and subsoil. To achieve these hegemonic ends, Europe founds colonies in Africa, with a policy of two tendencies, namely direct domination and indirect rule. [10] These two types of domination have one element in common: governance through terror, which for our purposes is tantamount to terrorism.

Direct domination consisted in eliminating, in a systematic way, the local political organization, in order to install a total colonial power. It should be noted that the chiefdoms in ancient Africa were not military

powers, but forms of social organizations in order to survive and sustain the clan. By settling, by the force of firearms among peoples who are ignorant of writing and Western languages, the colonizer has granted title deeds on land, thereby depriving the colonized peoples the right to property and the legitimate right to offer hospitality. It is an expropriation by Western positive law, a right ignored by the Africans of the time, while cosmopolitanism was the key concept of international relations in Europe.

This self-attribution of African lands will be a matter between European countries, which will be treated in Europe, at the expense of the virginal innocence of Africans in terms of contractual texts. Can we sign a contract with those who are unaware of the meaning and scope of positive law, and who are not already organized in nation-states?

As a result, the armed struggles related to the colonial installation cannot be described as a war of conquest, because it implies, at least, an appropriate communication, a declaration that marks the beginning and another that marks the end of the war. . By dispossessing Africa of its land, in fact, Europe enters into contradiction with its own roots of political modernity and law. Indeed, according to John Locke, it is the right to property that founds civil society. To deprive the African of the right of property is to shut the door of the city or, more fundamentally, to call into question his humanity: only humans can enter into commerce with their peers, and to live in the city is to be considered civilized.

Possessing only a lower degree of humanity, the colonized African could not organize his existence on the earth trampled by his feet, according to the political and administrative rules coming from the European Enlightenment, which the colonizing Europe still struggled to adopt, as a whole, as a common culture. How to assume a present from a past that has not been the present of his ancestors, a past whose authors still look with an eye of apprentices? The right to property, which has become a fundamental right of the human person, comes from the passage of the West to modern times, understood as accession to the new life, centered on the social celebration of individual rights. Was it possible to offer the African colonized a right snatched from bitter struggles by the French revolutionaries, enlightened by the political theorists of the English Channel?

In truth, the colonized African was seen as either a potential commodity or a labor force. And the regime of the natives, whose tax, corporal punishment, and compulsory labor were the modes of operation, best conveyed the idea of the commodity-man. Drunk from the illusory nectar of the superiority of Western civilization, convinced of the universal scope of their culture, the French colonials launched the project of *French peace*, a sort of empire, with the aim of transforming colonization into democratization of the colonies, with the assimilation of the colonized with the prestigious title of *French citizens of the metropolis*.

In addition, indirect domination has resulted in the political disorganization of African societies. It was a question of transforming traditional political institutions, with the installation of cantonal chiefs, a true extension of the colonizing arm, at the expense of the prestige and privileges of African leaders with hereditary power. The aim was to wrest the Africans from their customs and mental structures, to lead them little by little to the selected lights of the colonized condition. It is a political liberation, based on a sovereignty of alienation, coming from foreign lands of the West.

Coming from diverse ethnic groups, with heterogeneous structures of government, Africans gather in geographical territory cut under the name of country, without being able to constitute a nation, with a well-defined collective ideal, if not that of freeing oneself from the colonial system. But can we found a nation, called to last, on a specific idea of political liberation?

This enterprise of *annihilation of political activity* has resulted in a real change in the structure of the political imagination of Africans, so that their political reactions to the colonial phenomenon were first expressed indirectly, through syncretic religious movements, led by leaders animated by the intentions of an eschatological and millenarian revolution. The religious leaders, of a religion at the crossroads of local beliefs and the borrowing of revealed religions, pose as announcers of a political liberation of the black continent, with a religious aim; with the sole political aim, the negation of the colonial situation or the conquest of political autonomy, now identified with the liberation of the black race.

From the beginning, the colonization is an intrusion, bringing to the African soil foreign people and their vision of the world, so that on the side of the Africans who underwent colonization, it was necessary to locate these agents and these new elements, to be able to stand up on their land, which exiled themselves in foreign posture under their feet. In this sense, the reworked and adapted political imagination makes it possible to make intelligible these disturbing factors that are the values, the elements that the colonization

introduces. In addition, the ritual that is associated with this imaginary, shows a certain grip on these unusual elements and modifiers.

By way of example, the use of goods introduced by colonization was associated with the material symbols guaranteeing matrimonial exchanges during customary marriage. They also became, in different places, signs of political sovereignty, in the case of the chiefs and notables who integrated them, in a will to compete with the colonizer with his own methods. There are steps that reveal a gross awareness of the colonial situation; and it is by this that the phenomenon concerns us. Indeed, from the moment national movements take shape, they are directed by a certain number of leaders, and the political ideology is built. It is articulated more or less well, with the mythical themes of revolt or resistance.

Initially, the initiative belongs to a minority of so-called "Western" intellectual formation, a minority anxious to promote a cultural liberation at the same time as a political liberation. In the case of African countries, and for a while, the emphasis has been more on the first of these requirements, namely cultural liberation, than on the second, political liberation.

Regarding the origin of ethnic groups in Africa, the studies conducted by Western researchers are moving in two opposite directions. The first direction is that of Marxist anthropologists [11] who think ethnic groups are a colonial creation. They were born of the will of the colonial administration to territorialize the African continent, with a rational management, based on the division into ethnic entities. It was only later that the African peoples would have integrated these ethnic identities. Consequently, ethnicity is the expression of a false consciousness, whose mobilization is based on a desire to manipulate, in order to divert the people from real social struggles.

The second direction is supported by researchers from the historical and sociological school. [12] The ethnic groups, without being the invention of the colonizer, would be reformulated and named by this one. It is the colonizer who would have created ethnic borders, with the codification of indigenous languages, the spatialization of their action and the fixing of certain customs, on the basis of the existing organizational crumbs.

Beyond the question of the origin of ethnic groups in Africa, it is necessary to question the fact that the feeling of ethnicity is likely to be mobilized for purposes of social manipulation: why Africans put in place political parties on the basis of ethnic coloring, whether assumed or actual? The colonial moment was the occasion of the administration of the conquered societies, through the construction of knowledge about the colonies, in order to get to know them better, and to develop a reliable colonial management. Such a project can only suffer from internal contradictions, because the colonial administration classifies the ethnic groups according to their specific difference with the rest of humanity, in the name of a mission of universal civilization. In such a context, everything suggests that the manipulators of ethnicity in Africa use this ethnic imaginary born during the colonial period. It suffices to analyze the situation of ethnic groups in Africa before colonization to justify this hypothesis.

Before colonization, ethnic affiliation is limited to a clan-type identity recognition. African societies traded with each other, under a good-neighborly background, with some very limited conflicts in relation to their strategic capacity. But none of these companies tried to impose their identity on others. It is not an exaggeration to say that at this time, respect for ethnic diversity and the legitimation of power depend on respect for ethnic diversity, because there is no political or economic administrative constraint that justifies expansionist hegemony of an ethnic group.

It is thus the colonial conquest which, by coming to establish the state administration, imposes a colonial identity, through the homogenization, even if it is by constraint, of multi-ethnic African societies. Such an operation has produced different attitudes among the peoples of Africa. But these will not passively undergo this process. Some implement strategies of revolt, constituting themselves as counter-societies. Others adopt the game of the colonizer as a means of access to the state and its wealth. Whatever the attitude adopted by Africans to colonial ethnicity, there is now the opposition between the state, the political center that identifies with the nation as the leveling of ethnic groups, and the peripheries.

Therefore, the mobilization of ethnicity as a mode of enunciation of politics is therefore part of a particular socio-historical context of competition for power. The ethnic mobilization becomes a privileged instrument of the actors involved in this fight, because it is functional and easy to handle.

The manipulation of ethnic feeling is possible because of the existence of a identity narrative that founds the unity of the ethnic group. Such a narrative, with the force of orality, shapes the collective memory, linking the past to the present and confers on the claimed identity the legitimacy of historical perpetuity. It is about telling the myth of origins, the elements that distinguish the group from others. Such elements are not necessarily justified in their historical existence; what matters is that they present all appearances and impose themselves as the only regime of truth.

The first attempt of postcolonial African states to fight against ethnic affiliations is summed up in official political rhetoric totally dedicated to the exaltation of national unity and development. The independent state set itself the task of building the nation by bringing together ethnic groups. The first instrument necessary for its fulfillment was the unique party, proclaimed as a privileged place for the gathering of all ethnicities. Despite the advent of multiparty democracy, the ruling parties in Africa still retain this background of ethnic federation.

In this way, if the state wants to be the incarnation of the nation, it is itself invested through ethnic balance issues. The absence of good political and economic governance makes ethnicity the guiding horizon for political management, as the state in Africa is often the monopoly of a group or groups formed into clan networks, in conflict with other groups or other networks. In this context, the fight against ethnicity and tribalism, as stated by the politicians, is limited to a pretext for the marginalization of competitors who pose a threat to the hegemony of the dominant groups.

The end of single-party regimes in Africa is reflected in a resurgence of ethnicity, which is not an effect of democratic reforms or the restoration of multiparty politics. The current ethnicity, at the heart of the conflicts in Africa, is undoubtedly a consequence of the bad assimilation of the republican forms of the State, and their idea of fair competition for the accession to power. From an almost total absence of one-party electoral competition, we are now moving to a competition that is part of a multiparty system, marked by the proliferation of new political parties eager to take advantage of the new electoral opportunities. .

In this context of electoral competition, the use by political leaders of the repertoire of ethnicity seems to be the surest way to mobilize the electorate and win votes. Thus, to overcome the use of ethnic manipulation, it is urgent to initiate another way of being a citizen in Africa, relieved of the weight of clan residues. Such an approach goes through a kind of purification of the imaginary of the violence coming from the colonization. Here are some facts of violence to remember.

During the last third of the nineteenth century [13], Europeans set out to conquer the world with a focus on Africa. In May 1890, in a famous text called the " *speech of the perpendicular* ", Eugène Étienne, the leader of the "colonial party" in France, established the outlines of this new imperial project, which should encompass, in the same perimeter, all the countries located in the west of Tunisia, Lake Chad and Congo; he already sees the completion of the conquest of all of West Africa, whose project was initiated ten years earlier. There was in the Congo, which was operated in " concessions ", the case Gaud and Toqué. These two administrators, on July 14, put grenades around the neck of a black man to blow him up. This is a fact that has negatively affected people's minds. At the same time, the opinion in France considered that if France did not make the conquest, it would be the English or the Germans who would sweep the stake. In this way, the colonial conquest made Africa the battlefield between Western nationalisms: to the white officers, the glory of conquest. However, 90% to 99% of soldiers who execute the killings orders in colonial Africa are African, initially recruited in Senegal as *skirmishers*, then on the spot as the conquest advances; they are responsible for looting and destroying crops. On the French side, in West and Central Africa, there is an excess mortality, the victims do not die because of their "gender", but because of a system, and among those who kill there are blacks.

Such violence was constitutive of the colonial system. From the colonial conquest (supreme horror) and the resistance it provoked, Africa emerged today, the daughter of violence and state terrorism. This is why African integration is still problematic today. From colonization, there remains territorial and psychological balkanization, so that the enemy is the other African. It was necessary for the settler to conquer, and it must have cost the least possible. It was necessary to somehow save the *blood and gold of France* . And the best way to achieve this is terror there.

Postcolonial Africa has not finished paying the price of colonial violence. A Army culture settled. Thus, Idi Amin was a soldier in the British army, which crushed the Mau Mau revolt in the 1950s and, in the armed that represses in Madagascar in 1947, then in Indochina, there are few French officers and many colonial troops. The system in which people are killed by making them suffer stems from those terrible years of colonization.

7 CONCLUSION: ON THE VOULET-CHANOINE MISSION

We conclude this study with the analysis of the Voulet-Chanoine mission. This analysis makes it possible to show that the system in which people are killed in Africa today by making them suffer stems from these terrible years of colonization.

This mission reveals an essential truth : the violence that accompanies the colonial activity of France is only the reflection of the political chaos that reigns at the internal level of the State. And the colonial conquest undertaken by France at the time of the Voulet-Chanoine affair, was an opportunity to make forget the defeat of 1870. Indeed, in 1898-99, the political regime is shaken by ministerial crises. 1898 is the year of Fachoda's humiliation [14] and in 1899, the review of the Dreyfus trial is announced. The scandal of the Dreyfus trial has torn the country apart enough. The case originated in a miscarriage of justice on the basis of espionage and anti - Semitism, the victim of which was Captain Alfred Dreyfus (1859-1935), Jew and Alsatian of origin.

For twelve years, from 1894 to 1906, she upset French society. At the end of 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, accused of delivering secret documents to the Germans, was sentenced to life imprisonment for treason. At this date the French political class is unanimously unfavorable to Dreyfus.

The consequences of this case are innumerable and affect all aspects of French public life. At the political level, it consecrates the triumph of the Third Republic, of which it becomes a founding myth while renewing nationalism. At its peak in 1899, it reveals the divisions of France in the Third Republic. It deeply and durably divides the French into two opposing camps: Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards.

At the military and religious level, it slows down the reform of French Catholicism, as well as the republican integration of Catholics, social, legal, media, diplomatic and cultural. The affair also has an international impact on the Zionist movement through one of its founding fathers, Theodore Herzl, and with the excitement that its anti-Semitic demonstrations will provoke in the Jewish communities of Central and Western Europe.

France therefore intended to colonize Africa, officially, in the name of democracy, in line with the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the principles of the revolution of 1789. The pursuit of colonial expansion is seen as the means " of avoid an irremediable lapse. To improve its image, one of the missions now assigned to colonization is to reunite the French around a colonial project that contributes to *the resurrection of national pride*. [15] There will therefore be a divergence of opinions among French politicians on the content and purpose of giving to colonization. Thus, about the civilizing mission of France, Jules Ferry declared in the House : " *If France wants to remain a great country, she must wherever she can wear her language, her manners, her flag, her souls and her genius (...)* I repeat that there is a right for the superior races, because there is a duty for them. The duty to civilize the inferior races. " [16]

Two days later, in the same room, Clemenceau replied :

" *Lower breeds ! Higher breeds ! It's soon said. For my part, I've been down since I saw German scientists scientifically demonstrate that French is a race inferior to German. No, there is no right of the so-called higher nations against the so-called inferior nations (...)* The conquest you advocate is the outright abuse of the strength that the scientific civilization gives to rudimentary civilizations to appropriate the man, to torture him and to extract all the strength that is in him for the benefit of the so-called civilizer. But let us not try to assume the violence of the hypocritical name of civilization. "

On the other hand, the idea of colonizing seems to come from a new mentality that is emerging in Europe, with the appearance of specialists or professionals of Africa. They are soldiers, who are no longer

ordinary soldiers but the "founder of Empire." The army is an element of national unity, and the colonial wars carry with them an unheard-of brutality: Paul Voulet, son of a doctor, first hired as a private in the navy before becoming a captain, described as a cruel and bloodthirsty man, Lieutenant Charles Chanoine comes from Saint-Cyr, his father is a general before becoming a certain time Minister of War, the two officers are ambitious and career-minded. The *mission Central Africa* is timely. They are responsible for conquering many territories in the heart of Africa and this cannot be done smoothly. The army has its codes and its rules on the European soil but in Africa everything seems allowed since the populations are in essence inferior.

Thus, in January 1899, the Voulet-Chanoine mission met on the unoccupied left bank of Niger. It took place for almost three months in the region corresponding to the current West-Nigerien, a region ravaged by successive wars throughout the nineteenth century. The French came up around 1897. A few skirmishers commanded by a native corporal were installed along the river, south of Say.

As for the mission proper, it begins when Voulet disputed the information coming from the populations of the left bank and the policy led by France. On 16 April this year, Colonial Minister A. Guillaïn took the decision to replace Voulet and Chanoine at the head of the mission in case the allegations of abuse and abuse were confirmed. It required a detailed description of their methods.

In truth, this mission had turned into a plunder horde that sowed devastation and death. Voulet imagined that he would not be accountable at the end of the mission. Indeed, in this spirit of colonial conquest, success justified everything. Thus, the assassination of Voulet and Canon, killed by their own men, somehow arranged everyone.

The Voulet-Chanoine mission is the symbol of the colonial conquest pushed to its climax [17]. The Voulet-Chanoine expedition, composed of 50 skirmishers, 20 spahis, 200 auxiliary skirmishers and 700 carriers, is supervised by 8 white officers and non-commissioned officers. It starts in January 1899. It shows an incredible brutality, which culminates in May by the destruction of a city of 8 000 inhabitants, Birni N'Konni, in the current Niger. The two officers raid, loot, kill in cold blood the African people. They leave behind corpses and the announcement of their misdeeds spreads like wildfire. They bring back their trophies : cut heads. The deputy Vigné d'Octon, who is on the lookout for all the colonial scandals, is protesting against the actions of the two officers. He made a request for investigation on October 8, 1899. It was rejected by the Chamber of Deputies on 7 December 1900. The survey required by the Colonial ended on 1st September 1900. There will not now. It is true that both officers had "the good taste of dying fast". The republic cannot afford another scandal because the Dreyfus affair has torn the country apart. It is therefore necessary to finish the mission at all costs by avoiding the "burrs". Capitaines Joalland and Meynier will help to complete brilliantly the mission Central Africa. They quickly forget the serious dysfunctions of the Voulet-Chanoine mission. Later the two officers are appointed generals.

Needlessly bloody, barbaric, this mission is not a private initiative or a company of two isolated and unknown officers ; it participates in a program of colonization ("pacification") of sub-Saharan Africa. The personality of Voulet and Chanoine is undoubtedly at the root of the extreme violence of this column, but it does not explain everything : neither French nor African side. The question of "pacification" and "exactions" of the colonial conquest remains to be questioned, beyond the personal madness of Voulet and Canon.

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